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Glide Path to an "Inclusionary
Rule": How Expansion of the
Good Faith Exception Threatens
to Fundamentally Change the
Exclusionary Rule
James P. Fleissner
During recent political debates over the federal budget deficit, it
became fashionable to speak of a "glide path" to a balanced budget.
Advocates of a budget plan would plan certain tax rates and spending
limits, factor in a set of economic assumptions, and graph a swooping
path of declining deficits over several years. Needless to say, that sort
of exercise in prediction does not involve the sort of odds that would
inspire confidence in a gambler. The accuracy of the beguiling graph, of
course, depends on whether tax and spending commitments are kept and
whether a host of economic assumptions are correct. Common sense tells
us to be wary: Reality may well convert that smooth arc of descent into
a line resembling an "up" staircase.
Making predictions about the future of our constitutional jurisprudence is a similarly risky business. Shifts in the interpretation of the
United States Constitution depend on many variables, from the direction
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of the political winds to the chance occurrence of a case and controversy
that raises a constitutional issue in the right factual setting. Despite
the difficulty of the predictive enterprise, I believe that the jurisprudence
of the Fourth Amendment is on a "glide path" toward a fundamental
change in the Exclusionary Rule, which currently forbids the use of
much illegally seized evidence. I believe that we are on a course towards
an erosion of the Exclusionary Rule and a diminution of our rights. I
fear that the Exclusionary Rule will be converted into a rule of inclusion.
I see the principal vehicle for traveling this glide path as the continued
expansion of the good faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule.
In its 1984 decision in United States v. Leon,' the United States
Supreme Court recognized a good faith exception to the Exclusionary
Rule in a case when the police, acting in good faith, conducted a search
pursuant to a warrant that, although issued by a magistrate, was later
held by a reviewing court not to be supported by probable cause. As I
will discuss, there is now growing support for extending the good faith
exception to warrantless searches and seizures, so that evidence found
by a court to be illegally obtained through unreasonable warrantless
searches or seizures would not be excluded if law enforcement officers
acted with an objective, good faith belief that their actions were legal.
The rationale most often advanced for this position goes something like
this: The purpose of the Exclusionary Rule is to deter misconduct by the
police, and you cannot deter people who are acting in good faith. In the
absence of any deterrent impact, so the argument goes, the truth-seeking
process should not be distorted by excluding evidence. Supporters of this
argument have extended it to justify eliminating the remedy of exclusion
in cases of good faith violations of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
To embrace the arguments for extending the holding of Leon,
arguments which have gained a measure of legitimacy, would seriously
undermine the protections of the Constitution by eliminating incentives
for the law enforcement establishment to properly train officers and for
individual officers to adhere strictly to the directives of that training.
I think you will agree that a fundamental change of the Exclusionary
Rule through expansion of the good faith exception is, at least, a
plausible scenario and, more likely, a distinct possibility. I hope you will
agree that such a path would be the wrong course.
*This Article is comprised of three sections. The first section describes
the origins of the good faith exception using Professor Herbert L.
Packer's two models of the criminal process as a way of charting and
understanding events leading to the recognition of the good faith
exception. The second section describes the political forces and legal

1.

468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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developments that may provide the impetus for expansion-of the good
faith exception in the Fourth Amendment context and, possibly, Fifth
and Sixth Amendment contexts as well. The final section makes the
case against further expansion of the good faith exception to the
Exclusionary Rule in cases of Fourth Amendment violations involving
warrantless searches and seizures.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The famous text of the Fourth Amendment does not mention an
exclusionary remedy for violations of the amendment, much less
exceptions to such a remedy. Indeed, the amendment defines the right
created in broad, sweeping terms:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants will issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 2
Among the questions not answered in the text are these two: (1) What
is an "unreasonable" search and seizure? (2) What should or must be
the remedy when the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures is violated? Not surprisingly, reasonable persons have
disagreed on the answers to these questions.
In analyzing the different points of view on the proper meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, it is useful to make reference to the framework
provided by Professor Herbert L. Packer in his famous article entitled,
"Two Models of the Criminal Process."' Professor Packer defined two
dominant views of the criminal justice system: the Crime Control Model
and the Due Process Model.4 The Crime Control Model is based on a
value system that holds that "the repression of criminal conduct is by far

2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
Professor Packer's article has been subjected to much scholarly analysis and criticism, as
well as some praise. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies,72 GEo. L.J. 185, 209-28
(1983); Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriersto Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 571-76 (1973); John Griffiths,
Ideology in CriminalProcedure, or a Third 'Model" of the CriminalProcess, 79 YALE L.J.

359 (1970); William J. Genego, The New Advesary, 54 BROO& L. REV. 781, 842-56 (1988).
The critical literature raises many interesting issues, but in the author's view, Packer's
models remain very useful for describing the values and forces competing to shape the
criminal justice system.
4. Packer, supra note 3, at 6.
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the most important function to be performed by the criminal process."'
The Crime Control Model's goal is the efficient apprehension and
punishment of criminals.8 The ultimate goal is to protect the lawabiding citizen. One might say that the Crime Control Model would
interpret the Bill of Rights in light of certain ends outlined in the
Preamble of the Constitution: to establish justice and insure domestic
tranquility.
The Due Process Model, as defined by Professor Packer, is rooted in
different values: "If the Crime Control Model resembles an assembly
line, the Due Process Model looks very much like an obstacle course.
Each of its successive stages is designed to present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the process."' The
Due Process Model is based on a skeptical view of the accuracy of the
process for determining guilt, as well as a willingness to allow a guilty
person to go free "if various rules designed to safeguard the integrity of
the process are not given effect."s
The contrast between the models is stark. The Crime Control Model
intends to protect citizens from crime and allow them to enjoy the
blessings of liberty. The Due Process Model intends to ensure that the
government does not act oppressively or tolerate appreciable risks of
inaccurate findings of guilt. The tension between these two models is
what animates the debate about how to answer the crucial questions
concerning the proper meaning to ascribe to the Fourth Amendment and
the desirability of sanctioning violations with the exclusion of evidence.
Indeed, Professor Packer noted that the issue of whether the criminal
process should be designed "for correcting its own abuses" is an issue
that "may well account for a greater amount of the distance between the
two models."9 He wrote:
In theory the Crime Control Model can tolerate rules that forbid illegal
arrests, unreasonable searches, coercive interrogations, and the like if

their enforcement is left primarily to managerial sanctions internally
imposed. What it cannot tolerate is the vindication of those rules in

the criminal process itself through the exclusion of evidence illegally
obtained or through the reversal of convictions in cases where the
criminal process has breached the rules laid down for its observance.
The availability of these corrective devices fatally impairs the efficiency
of the process. The Due Process Model, while it may in the first

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10-13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
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instance be addressed to the maintenance of reliable factfinding
techniques, comes eventually to incorporate prophylactic and deterrent
rules that result in the release of the factually guilty even in cases in
which blotting out the illegality would still leave an adjudicative
factfinder convinced of the accused's guilt.'0
The Crime Control Model suffers from an inconsistency as well: While
touting criminal punishment to deter crime, the Crime Control Model
decries the sanction of exclusion to deter misconduct by the government.
The clash between the models is also seen in how proponents of each
answer these charges of inconsistency. Due Process Model advocates are
willing to release the factually guilty to deter government violations of
rights. Crime Control Model advocates prefer to allow the use of
illegally seized evidence to convict the factually guilty and deter crime,
and use less extreme methods to deter illegal seizures. That is not to
say that each of the models reject outright the values of the other model.
The Due Process Model recognizes the value of punishing the guilty and
fighting crime; the Crime Control Model accepts the value of a fair
process that protects the rights of the accused. But each model's position
on the Exclusionary Rule is consistent with its respective hierarchy of
values.
Supporters of each of these two models of the criminal process might
take extreme positions on the Exclusionary Rule. The Crime Control
Model advocate might argue for no exclusion of evidence whatsoever,
leaving other means to try to address government overreaching. The
Due Process Model advocate might argue for an absolute rule of
exclusion for any improperly seized evidence. It should not come as a
surprise that the history of the Exclusionary Rule is a story of a middle
course of compromise between these extremes.
The first of the landmarks was Weeks v. United States,11 in which the
Supreme Court read the Fourth Amendment as requiring the exclusion
of evidence illegally seized by federal law enforcement officers. The Court
stated:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United
States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike,
whether accused of a crime or not, and the duty of giving it force and

10.
11.

Id. at 17-18.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with
the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful
seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts,
which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution,
and to which people in all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.1"
The Court concluded that to sanction the illegal conduct by allowing use
of the evidence "would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest
neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution,
intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized
action."" Weeks read an Exclusionary Rule into the Fourth Amendment. The rationale for this result was expressed in terms of judicial
integrity, but the decision also implies a deterrent purpose.
In Wolf v. Colorado,4 the Supreme Court held that although the
Fourth Amendment was enforceable against the states as "incorporated"
into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Weeks Exclusionary Rule was
not.'" Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf noted that the Weeks
Exclusionary Rule "was not derived from the explicit requirements of the
Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The decision was
a matter of judicial implication." 6 Because most states and nations
had declined to adopt an Exclusionary Rule to protect privacy rights, the
Court stated that "we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential
ingredient of the right." 7 The Court left the states free to use other
methods to sanction violations, such as private lawsuits, finding that the
other methods, "if consistently enforced, would be equally effective." 8
Thus, the Court portrayed the status of the Exclusionary Rule as
something less than part and parcel of the core of the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
The Court further defined the purpose and status of the Exclusionary
Rule in Elkins v. United States, 9 when it held that evidence illegally
seized by state officers would be excluded as evidence in a federal
court.20 The purpose of the rule was stated in this way: "The rule is

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 394.
338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
338 U.S. at 33.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Id. at 223.
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calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."21 This language
elevates the policy goal of deterrence to the forefront, unobscured by
rhetoric about judicial integrity. This statement also disparages the
effectiveness of the other methods of enforcing the Fourth Amendment
alluded to in Wolf. Indeed, the Court in Elkins engaged in a discussion
of the empirical proof supporting the effectiveness of the Exclusionary
Rule, concluding that available statistical proof was inconclusive, but
that "pragmatic evidence" indicated that exclusion was effective.22 As
for the status of the Exclusionary Rule, the Court in Elkins invoked its
supervisory powers over the federal courts and did not characterize the
rule as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment.2' The decision in
Elkins strongly endorsed the Exclusionary Rule as the only effective
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, but refused to characterize
the rule as inherent in the protection of the Amendment. To so
characterize the Exclusionary Rule would raise the question of why the
rule was not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied
to the states by the Court in Wolf.
That, of course, was the issue raised in Mapp v. Ohio.24 In Mapp, the
Court overruled Wolf, holding that "all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court."25 In order to accomplish the incorporation of the Exclusionary Rule into the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
necessary to declare that the rule was an essential part of the Fourth
Amendment, a declaration the Court had declined to make in prior
cases. 26 The Court reaffirmed its endorsement of the Exclusionary Rule
as the only effective means of deterring constitutional violations,
denouncing the alternatives with terms like "worthless and futile."27
Mapp represents the Exclusionary Rule at its zenith. The rule was
declared part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment, one and inseparable.
The rule was declared the only effective means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment. And the rule was imposed on the states. The Due Process
Model was ascendent.

21. Id. at 217.
22. Id. at 218-21.
23. Id. at 216.
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. Id. at 655.
26. Id. at 657.
27. Id. at 651-52.
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Since Mapp, various limitations on the Exclusionary Rule have been
imposed. These limitations on the scope and applicability of the remedy
of exclusion have been based on reasoning consistent with the Crime
Control Model: When the ends of the Exclusionary Rule are not
significantly advanced by exclusion, the government should be allowed
to use the evidence to convict the defendant. Several examples will
suffice at this juncture. One example is the refusal of the Supreme
Court to apply the Exclusionary Rule to grand jury proceedings because
doing so would create only an uncertain incremental deterrent effect."8
Another example is the doctrine on standing to raise Fourth Amendment
claims, which limits the availability of the exclusionary remedy to the
victims of the illegal search.2' Yet another example is the inevitable
discovery doctrine, which holds that illegally seized evidence need not be
excluded if the prosecution would inevitably have found the evidence
despite the illegal seizure.3 0 These doctrines exemplify a shift toward
promoting the values of the Crime Control Model.
The good faith exception is another such limitation to the Exclusionary
Rule based on the promotion of the values of the Crime Control Model.
The good faith exception is, I contend, the most critical limitation of the
rule, not because of what it is today, but because of what it might
become. In United States v.Leon,"1 the Court addressed the question
of whether the Exclusionary Rule should bar the use of evidence
obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a magistrate but ultimately declared by a reviewing court not
to be supported by probable cause. 2 In contrast to the rhetoric in the
Mapp decision, the Court in Leon portrayed the exclusionary remedy in
a less reverent manner: The rule was called "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." 33 The determination of whether to apply the Exclusionary
Rule would "be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing
the use in the prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy
tangible evidence" obtained in reliance on a search warrant. 34
In weighing the costs and benefits, the Court in Leon found the price
of excluding evidence to be high. The Court expressed concern with the

28.
29.
(1978);
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. at 900.
Id. at 906 (quoting Calandra,414 U.S. at 348).
Id. at 907.
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Exclusionary Rule's interference with the truth-seeking process.35
Under the circumstances in which the officer acted in good faith in
executing a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, the
Court concluded that the deterrent benefit of exclusion would be
"marginal or nonexistent."36 The Court made it clear that the rule was
designed to deter police misconduct and not to punish or deter errors by
judges. The Court stated that because judges do not have a stake in the
of exclusion would not have any significant
outcome of cases, the threat
37
effect on their behavior.
There are two aspects of the decision in Leon that need to be
highlighted because of their importance to the debate over extending the
good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures. The most
important point is that the holding of Leon was limited to allowing a
good faith exception in cases where officers reasonably relied on a
warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.38 The Leon case
presented a situation in which the officers offered an application for a
warrant to a magistrate who approved the warrant as being supported
by probable cause. 9 Thus, the Court allowed a good faith exception
when a judicial officer approved a warrant before a search and when the
officers relied in good faith on the judicial officer's determination that
probable cause existed. In its discussion of the good faith exception it
was creating, the Court emphasized the importance of the fact that the
actions of the officers had been reviewed by a magistrate, who, although
later reversed by a reviewing court, acted as a buffer to check the actions
of the officers.4 ° In fact, the Court went to great lengths to state that
it was not diluting any of the precedents ensuring the integrity of the
warrant process, such as the requirement that the magistrate maintain
a neutral and detached judicial role and the rule that suppression is
appropriate where an application for a warrant is found to contain
information the officer knew or should have known to be false.4 ' Not
only did the Court place great emphasis on the importance of the role of
the magistrate, but it drew a contrast with warrantless searches and
seizures:

35,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 907-08.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 916-17.
Id. at 920-21.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 913-25.
Id. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154 (1978).
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Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper
searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer
'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,'" we
have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that "in
a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall." 2
The second aspect of the decision in Leon to highlight is the Court's
concern over the need to continue to create incentives for the law
enforcement establishment to properly train officers. In discussing the
deterrent objective of the Exclusionary Rule, the Court referred to
altering "the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the
policies of their departments."43 When one speaks of a deterrent, the
usual meaning is to prevent undesirable conduct by threatening
punishment. The language of deterrence tends to obscure an important
result of the Exclusionary Rule, that of creating incentives for law
enforcement agencies to train officers to avoid constitutional violations.4 4 In Leon, the Court adopted a good faith exception requiring
that the good faith of the officer be objectively reasonable.45 This
means that the warrant presented to the magistrate for review must be
one that a reasonably well trained officer could believe to be based on
probable cause. Therefore, if a warrant is so lacking in probable cause
that a reasonably well trained officer could not believe that there was
probable cause, obtaining the approval of an inattentive or inept
magistrate would not save the fruits of the search under the objective
good faith standard. The Court was explicit about why it adopted this
objective test: The aim was to retain incentives for the police to continue
training officers about the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.46
This completes the tracing of the development of the good faith
exception to the Exclusionary Rule. The adoption of the Exclusionary
Rule and its application to the states was an obvious victory for
advocates of the Due Process Model of criminal justice. The adoption of
rules limiting the scope of the Exclusionary Rule, such as the good faith
exception, amounted to movement back in the direction of the values of
the Crime Control Model. The next section will explore the possibility
that the good faith exception will become the vehicle for further
significant movement away from the values of the Due Process Model.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46,

468 U.S. at 913-14 (citations omitted).
Id. at 918.
Id. at 919-20.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 919 n.20.
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THE GLIDE PATH TO THE EXPANSION OF THE GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION

It is a distinct possibility that political forces and legal developments
may lead to a significant expansion of the good faith exception. In the
Fourth Amendment context, the most significant potential for expansion
of the good faith exception is the area of warrantless searches and
seizures. Such a development, if it were to occur, would constitute a
major change in the Exclusionary Rule, allowing much illegally seized
evidence to be used and reducing the incentives for needed training of
law enforcement officers. Converting the Exclusionary Rule into an
"Inclusionary Rule" would mark a swing of the pendulum from the
middle area between the Due Process Model and the Crime Control
Model towards the values of the Crime Control Model. The change
would not be as dramatic as complete abandonment of the Exclusionary
Rule, but it would be a major move in that direction.
Let us begin with a brief overview of the role of warrantless searches
and seizures in the criminal justice system. Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has identified many instances in which law enforcement
officers may make warrantless searches and seizures. One example is
the rule that an officer may make a public arrest for commission of
crime if the officer has probable cause to do so, even if the officer could
have obtained a warrant without endangering the chances of apprehending the suspect. 47 Another example is the rule that officers may make

a warrantless entry and search if they have probable cause to believe
contraband is present and if available information indicates that
evidence will be destroyed; this is one of the so-called "exigent circumstances" exceptions.4
Warrantless arrests and seizures must be
supported by probable cause, just like warrants. As currently formulated by the Supreme Court, the standard of probable cause is whether,
based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that
evidence will be found in a particular place or that a suspect has
committed a crime.49 Probable cause requires that the facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable prudence
to believe that evidence will be found."0
The Fourth Amendment also regulates police-citizen encounters that
do not rise to the level of an arrest. The Fourth Amendment allows for

47. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973).
49. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
50. Id. at 231-32.
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brief investigatory detentions of persons and property if an officer has
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity, as well as limited authority
to perform a protective pat-down search of the seized person when there
may be danger to the officer.5 The reasonable suspicion standard has
been said to require "a particularized and objective basis," which is
something more than a hunch, and something less than probable
cause.52 Professor Anthony Amsterdam has referred to the reasonable
suspicion standard as that "pint-sized version of probable cause required
for stop-and-frisk."53
The Supreme Court has stated that the "probable cause" and
"reasonable suspicion" standards which govern warrantless searches and
seizures cannot be articulated with precision; "[tihey are instead fluid
concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts
in which the standards are being assessed."54 The only buffer between
citizens and unconstitutional warrantless searches and seizures is the
training and judgment of the law enforcement officer. If an officer
makes an illegal warrantless arrest or investigatory stop, the Exclusionary Rule operates to suppress evidence. If the good faith exception is
applied to warrantless searches and seizures, the finding of illegality
would not necessarily result in suppression. Instead, the good faith
exception would give rise to a second inquiry: Could a reasonably well
trained officer have believed in good faith that the standard required for
the search or seizure (i.e., probable cause or reasonable suspicion) had
been met? In other words, was the decision to conduct the search or
make the seizure a reasonable mistake in legal judgment by the officer?
These are the issues courts would face if the good faith exception is
expanded. That is a brief sketch of where the glide path would lead us.
Will politics and legal developments take us on that course? As for
the current political winds, it is clear that recent years have seen
growing support for the Crime Control Model and hostility to the
Exclusionary Rule. One obvious sign that the good faith exception might
become the vehicle for severely limiting the reach of the Exclusionary
Rule is the passage by the House of Representatives of the "Exclusionary
Rule Reform Act of 1995," which (some might say ominously) was
numbered as H.R. 666."5 This bill, which was passed by the House

51. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
53. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 414 (1974).
54. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996).
55. The text of H.R. 666 was as follows:
Admissibility of evidence obtained by search and seizure:
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pursuant to the Contract With America, declared that evidence obtained
by objectively reasonable searches and seizures, including warrantless
searches and seizures, would not be subject to the Exclusionary Rule in
the federal courts. Oddly, the bill contained two exceptions: The new
law would not apply to searches or seizures carried out by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms or the Internal Revenue Service.
Presumably, these bizarre exceptions were the product of the sponsors'
distrust of those agencies. In any event, singling out those agencies
certainly casts a partisan light on the House's foray into reform of the
Bill of Rights.56
With respect to the House legislation, one might pose the question
many lawyers hear: "Can they do that?" Can Congress pass a law
limiting the scope of the Exclusionary Rule as it is set forth in Supreme
Court decisions? Certainly the Supreme Court has the power to

(a) Evidence Obtained By Objectively Reasonable Search or Seizure- Evidence
which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded in a
proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that the search or seizure
was in violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
if the search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifying an objectively
reasonable belief that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment. The fact
that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant
constitutes prima facie evidence of the existence of such circumstances.
(b) Evidence Not Excludable By Statute or Rule(1) Generally- Evidence shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the
United States on the ground that it was obtained in violation of a statute, an
administrative rule or regulation, or a rule of procedure unless exclusion is
expressly authorized by statute or by a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority.
(2) Special Rule Regulating To Objectively Reasonable Searches and SeizuresEvidence which is otherwise excludable under paragraph (1) shall not be excluded
if the search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifying an objectively
reasonable belief that the search or seizure was in conformity with the statute,
administrative rule or regulation, or rule of procedure, the violation of which
occasioned its being excludable.
(c) Rules of Construction- This section shall not be construed to require or
authorize the exclusion of evidence in any proceeding. Nothing in this section
shall be construed so as to violate the fourth article of amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.
(d) Limitation- This section shall not apply with respect to a search or seizure
carried out by, or under the authority of, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms.
(e) Limitation- This section shall not apply with respect to a search or seizure
carried out by, or under the authority of, the Internal Revenue Service.
H.R. 666 (1995).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 104-17 (1995); Congressional Research Service, Exclusionary
Rule: Brief Overview of the Federal Fourth Amendment and Related Matters (1995).
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interpret the Constitution. . Certainly Congress can not amend the
Constitution through legislation. But, the Supreme Court has invited
legislative attempts to alter the Exclusionary Rule by giving the rule the
status of a judicially created remedy that is a creature of the Court's
supervisory power, not part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment. That
status, which makes the Exclusionary Rule sound like judicial legislation, emboldens the Congress to become an equal partner in the
legislative enterprise. As a matter of federalism, it is a curiosity how a
judicially created prophylactic measure is imposed on the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, as was done by the Court in Mapp. Of
course, the answer is that the Court in Mapp treated the Exclusionary
Rule as inherent in the Fourth Amendment; that is the very point on
which the decision in Mapp changed the prior holding in Weeks. Having
elevated the rule to constitutional status to apply it to the states, the
Court has since waffled and demoted the rule to a status that will allow
limiting its scope. That lower status is also what has allowed Congress
to get in on the act.
The death of H.R 666 in the Senate seems a good example of the basic
theories of the founders as reflected in civics textbooks: The House
reflects the passions of the electorate and the Senate proceeds with
deliberation and caution. However, it cannot be denied that the passion
is real. The House passage of the bill in February 1995 reflected
hostility to the Exclusionary Rule, as well as the selection of the good
faith exception as the vehicle to limit the rule.
Evidence of the current political climate could also be found in the last
presidential campaign. A major public controversy erupted when a
federal district court judge, appointed by President Clinton, suppressed
a large quantity of cocaine seized during a warrantless search of a car.
Judge Harold Baer, Jr. found that officers did not have probable cause
to search. Because the judge made some very critical comments about
the police, the case became a political issue. The Republicans blasted
the President's judicial appointments as too liberal, using Judge Baer's
suppression order as a prime example of letting the guilty off on
"technicalities." The Republicans promised tough, conservative judges
in a Dole administration. While the President defended his judicial
appointments as mainstream, he sharply criticized Judge Baer's
suppression order as being a bad ruling. As the political firestorm
raged, Judge Baer granted a motion to reconsider his ruling and
reversed his order of suppression."

57. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Finds Wit Tested by Criticism;Issue of Drug Search
Ruling Draws Angry Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at B2; Alison Mitchell, Clinton
Defends His Criticismof a New York Judge's Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at Al; Don
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The fight over the philosophy of the federal judiciary was also reflected
in the refusal of the Senate to confirm the President's judicial nominees
during the election season; confirmations were reduced to a trickle."8
With his reelection, the President will have the opportunity to nominate
over a hundred new federal judges.59
However, the Republican
leadership has vowed to be very tough in screening the nominees, and
there has been talk of pressuring the administration to cede up to half
the nominations to the Republicans.'
Furthermore, a group of
conservative House members has begun a movement to impeach activist
judges, and guess who tops the hit list? None other than Judge Harold
Baer." ' The current political climate is such that the President may
keep to his first term style and avoid sending controversial nominees.
That policy avoids expending political capital in nomination fights and
reduces the prospect that a nominee might be left to languish in the
limbo of a stalled confirmation process. With the Exclusionary Rule flap
from the election season still fresh in everyone's mind, it is clear that an
essential part of the profile of a "noncontroversial" nominee is disdain for
excluding evidence. There can be no doubt that the Exclusionary Rule
will be a prominent issue in the selection and confirmation ofjudges and
justices for quite some time.
Assuming the political will to make drastic changes in the scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, will judges have the legal theories and precedents to
make the glide path to an expanded good faith exception a reality? As
will be demonstrated, lawyers arguing for expansion of the good faith
exception to warrantless searches and seizures will have ample authority
to cite in their briefs. In comparison to the authority supporting the
good faith exception at the time of the decision in Leon, proponents will
have more to work with. However, other court decisions, including the
Supreme Court's last major decision on the good faith exception, will
provide support for the opponents of expanding the holding of Leon.
It is true that since Leon most federal courts have resisted extending
the good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures, usually by

Van Natta, Jr., DrugCase Reversal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at B5; Dan Balz, Dole Warns
of Liberal Judiciary; Clinton Appointees Soft on Criminals, Majority Leader Says,
WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 1996, at Al.
58. Too Many Federal Court Vacancies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at Al (during second
session of 104th Congress only 17 district court judges and no appellate judges confirmed,
despite vacancies approaching 100).
59. Id.; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1997, § 1, at 3.
60. Lewis, supra note 59.
61. Katherine Q. Seelye, House G.O.P.Begins Listing a Few Judges to Impeach, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at A5.
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noting the limits of the holding in Leon. 2 However, one pre-Leon
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
United States v. Williams, 3 adopted the good faith exception to the
Exclusionary Rule for all Fourth Amendment violations, with or without
a warrant.14 After Leon, the Fifth Circuit applied the good faith
exception to an investigatory stop and found support for its decision in
the Leon case." So far, the Fifth Circuit is alone in explicitly adopting
the good faith exception for warrantless searches and seizures. 6 As to
whether the Williams holding might eventually be considered by other
courts, consider the treatment given to the Williams decision in Leon.
In a footnote, the Court in Leon cited a long series of concurring and
dissenting Supreme Court opinions arguing that the Exclusionary Rule
needed to be reined in. At the end of the footnote, the Court noted that
these pronouncements by members of the Court had "no doubt influenced" the Fifth Circuit in the Williams decision. 67 There is no hint of
disapproval.
Another source of legal authority supporting the case for extention of
the good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures are the
Supreme Court cases setting forth the contours of qualified immunity in
tort cases involving allegations of Fourth Amendment violations by
police," In one qualified immunity case, the Court has held that an
officer is immune from liability for a Fourth Amendment violation
involving a warrantless search if the mistake was objectively reasonable. 9 The Court stated: "Law enforcment officers whose judgments
in making these difficult determinations are objectively legally reasonable should no more be held personally liable in damages than should
officials making analogous determinations in other areas of law."7 °
Thus the Court has applied a qualified immunity rule in cases involving

62. See United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36,44 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Winsor,
846 F.2d 1569, 1579 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1165 (6th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Boffman, 747 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
63. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
64. 622 F.2d at 840.
65. United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
66. However, the decision in Williams is arguably the law of the Eleventh Circuit as
well, as that case was part of the caselaw of the Fifth Circuit adopted by the Eleventh upon
its creation in 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
67. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913 n.11.
68. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Section 1983 action); Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (Bivens action).
69. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45.
70. Id. at 644. The court in Anderson did not discriminate between reasonable police
errors in probable cause determinations and police errors in reasonable suspicion cases.
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illegal warrantless searches and seizures that parallels the test that
would apply if the good faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule applied
to cases not involving a warrant. In essense, the Court has created and
administered the very test that might be applied if the the good faith
exception is extended. Advocates of extending the exception will argue
that the qualified immunity standard be "cloned" and applied in the
context of the Exclusionary Rule. The qualified immunity cases may be
a harbinger of the Court's predisposition to adopt such a test.
The Supreme Court's most recent case involving the good faith
exception may provide some solace to opponents of further expansion of
the exception, but ultimately the signals are mixed. In Arizona v.
Evans,v ' one of the few cases since Leon to explicitly discuss the good
faith exception,72 the Court discussed the rationale of the decision in
Leon. In Evans, the Court was faced with a situation in which a
defendant had successfully moved to suppress drugs seized from his car
when he was arrested on a warrant that previously had been quashed
but remained in a computer system because of an error by court
employees.73 The Court characterized the reasoning in Leon as focusing
on three factors. First, the Exclusionary Rule is designed to deter police
misconduct. Second, magistrates are not inclined to ignore the Fourth
Amendment, so the extreme sanction of exclusion of the evidence is
inappropriate. Third, excluding evidence because of an error by a
magistrate would not serve any deterrent purpose.74 Applying these
factors to the facts, the Court found that the Exclusionary Rule was not
designed to deter mistakes by court employees; that there was no
evidence that court employees are inclined to subvert the Fourth
Amendment; and that there is no basis to believe that exclusion would
effect the court employees' behavior.75 The Court distinguished court
employees from law enforcement officers engaged in the fight against
crime, stating that the court employees "have no stake in the outcome

71. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
72. The other cases were Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (expanding the good faith
exception to officers who acted in reasonable reliance on a statute later declared
unconstitutional) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (companion case to
Leon involving execution of a warrant). There has been some debate about whether other
Supreme Court cases not explicitly referring to the good faith exception should be treated
as belonging to the Leon line of cases. See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987);
David R. Childress, Note, Maryland u. Garrison: Extending the Good Faith Exception to
WarrantlessSearches, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 151 (1988).

73. 115 S. Ct. at 1187-88.
74. Id. at 1191.

75. Id. at 1193.
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of particular criminal prosecutions."76 This certainly suggests that the
Court has not abandoned its concerns about deterring misconduct by
those with a stake in the outcome of criminal cases, such as the police.
However, Justice Stevens' dissent suggested that he feared the
majority in Evans was beginning to blur what he believed to be the
proper limits of the holding in Leon:
The reasoning in Leon assumed the existence of a warrant; it was, and
remains, wholly inapplicable to warrantless searches and seizures ....
The Leon Court's exemption of judges and magistrates from the
deterrent ambit of the exclusionary rule rested, consistently with the
emphasis on the warrant requirement, on those officials' constitutionally determined role in issuing warrants. Taken on its own terms, Leon's
logic does not extend to the time after the warrant has issued; nor does
it extend to court clerks and functionaries, some of whom work in the
same building with police officers and may have more regular and
direct contact with police than with judges or magistrates. 7
Thus, while the decision in Evans does not clearly indicate any erosion
in the limits of the holding in Leon, there is substantial political support,
and some significant legal authority, for doing exactly that.
I should add one final note on where the glide path I have described
might lead us. This discussion has focused on the expansion of the good
faith exception in the Fourth Amendment context. There is no question
that if we follow the glide path expanding the good faith exception that
the first major developments will be in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. But it must be remembered that exclusionary remedies have also
been applied to violations of Fifth7" and Sixth79 Amendment rights as
well. If the good faith exception is expanded to warrantless searches
and seizures, it will set the stage for rolling back the exclusionary
remedies provided for violations of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Consider an example in the Fifth Amendment context. In Edwards v.
Arizona,"0 the Supreme Court held that once a suspect has invoked the
right to counsel pursuant to being read his Miranda rights, the suspect
may not be interrogated further until counsel has been made available,
unless the suspect initiates further communications.8 ' Any evidence
obtained by improper interrogation is excluded. It has also been held
that the Court's rule in Edwards is violated even where an officer

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Id. at 484-85.
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interrogates a suspect without knowing that the suspect had previously
invoked his right to counsel in a statement to another officer."2 The
government cannot seek to admit the evidence on the theory that the
interrogating officer's actions were in good faith because he was unaware
of the suspect's invocation of rights to the other officer; the knowledge
of the officer who heard the invocation of rights is said to be imputed to
the other.8 This rule obviously is designed to prevent the police from
trying to get around the rule requiring interrogation to cease upon the
invocation of the right. If the good faith exception is expanded to cover
warrantless searches and seizures that are unregulated by a judicial
officer, it will be argued that the same logic requires extention of the
exception to violations of the Edwards rule.
There are political forces and legal developments in the Fifth
Amendment context similar to those in the Fourth Amendment context
that set the stage for expansion of the good faith exception. For
example, the Supreme Court has characterized the Exclusionary Rule in
the Fifth Amendment context as judge-made rules that are "not
themselves rights protected by the constitution.""4 As we have seen in
the Fourth Amendment context, lowering the status of the Exclusionary
Rule makes it easier to roll back the scope of the rule.
Classifying the rule as judge-made also opens the door to legislative
efforts like H.R. 666. One remarkable, and often overlooked, development in the law of the Fifth Amendment is that Congress has already
enacted legislation, which, by its terms, repeals the judge-made
That
exclusionary remedies that enforce the Fifth Amendment. "

82. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687 (1988).
83. United States v. Webb. 755 F.2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1985).
84. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
(a) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence,
the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to
voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily
made it shall be admitted in evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall

instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves
under all the circumstances.

(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,

including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant
making the confession, if it was made after the arrest and before arraignment, (2)
whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was
charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3)

whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to

1042

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

legislation, which has been on the books since 1968, states that only
confessions that are involuntary will be excluded and that the failure to
follow procedures like those required by the decisions in Miranda and
Edwards will not automatically result in exclusion. Probably because of
suspicions that the statute is unconstitutional, the executive branch has
ignored it.' This unusual situation recently caused Justice Scalia to
issue a strong rebuke to the Justice Department, stating, "I will no
longer be open to the argument that this Court should continue to ignore
the commands of § 3501 simply because the Executive declines to insist
that we observe them." 7 As you can see from these judicial and
legislative developments, it is apparent that the glide path to limiting
the scope of the Exclusionary Rule is likely to go beyond the Fourth
Amendment context.
III.

THE CASE AGAINST EXPANSION OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

The holding of Leon should be adhered to strictly, as should its factual
premises. The good faith exception should not be expanded to cases
involving warrantless searches and seizures. Expanding the good faith
exception will skew the existing balance between the values of the Crime
Control Model and the Due Process Model in a way that will significantly diminish the protections of the Fourth Amendment. We should
change course from our current glide path.
I will advance three principal contentions in making the case against
expansion of the good faith exception. First of all, the Exclusionary Rule
is the most effective method of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. In the
Mapp decision, the Court noted that it is difficult to prove the effectiveness of the Exclusionary Rule by the use of statistics, but that significant proof for the value of the rule exists. Professors Wayne LaFave and
Jerold Israel have written:

make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4)
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right
to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without
the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of
the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)-(b).
86. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.5(e) (2d. ed. 1992) (§ 3501 "is
unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to repeal Miranda."). It should be noted that
the statute applies with equal force, whatever that may be, to the Sixth Amendment
exclusionary remedy set forth in Massiah, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra, at § 6.4(i).
87. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2358 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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That the suppression doctrine has had a deterrent effect is nonetheless
suggested by various post-exclusionary rule events, such as the
dramatic increase in the use of search warrants where nearly none
were used before, stepped up efforts to educate police on Fourth
Amendment law where such training had before been virtually
nonexistent, and creation and development of working relationships
between police and prosecutors."
As a former prosecutor and refugee from the law enforcement establishment, I strongly believe that the Exclusionary Rule not only deters
individual violations of the Fourth Amendment but creates incentives for
law enforcement to train officers. In Leon, the Court was careful to
adopt an objective good faith test to preserve the incentives for law
enforcement to train officers, citing with approval Professor Israel's
statement that the key to the Exclusionary Rule's effectiveness as a
deterrent is the incentive provided for police training. 9 The evidence
supporting the beneficial effects of the Exclusionary Rule can be
contrasted with the dismal record and prospects of the alternatives.
Professor Kamisar put it this way: "The overwhelming consensus is that
civil suits, criminal prosecution, injunctions, review boards, and internal
police discipline are sadly inadequate."' °
Of course, the decisions of the Supreme Court rightly assume that the
Exclusionary Rule can provide significant benefits. When those benefits
seems slight, as in Leon, the Court has found the cost of excluding the
evidence to outweigh the benefit. But, as recently as the decision in
Evans, the Court has reaffirmed that the Exclusionary Rule is aimed at
police misconduct because they are the ones with a stake in the outcome.
The Court has not indicated a retreat from the view that exclusion is a
valuable remedy when police conduct can be influenced and that the cost
of exclusion in individual cases is outweighed by the value of protecting
Fourth Amendment rights. A majority of the Court has not questioned
that the Exclusionary Rule is the most effective available means of
enforcing the Fourth Amendment.

88. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 86, at § 3.1(c).
89. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20.

90. Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of CriminalProcedure: A Reply to
ProfessorGrano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 562 (1990). Of course, this conclusion concerns

alternative sanctions as presently constituted. Would more effective tort remedies do a
better job of deterring abuses? Ironically, effective sanctions holding officers personally

liable might prove to be too effective, resulting in a sort of law enforcement paralysis. See
Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in CriminalCases,
57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 640 (1982).
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The second point is that the Exclusionary Rule is particularly
important in preventing illegal warrantless searches and seizures. On
the street, there is no magistrate to act as a buffer. The well intentioned
police officer will follow or violate the Constitution based on his or her
knowledge of the law. In Leon, the Court stressed that a case involving
a warrant approved by a magistrate is different from "the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime."'' This distinction should become the
firewall that prevents expansion of the good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures. The Court placed great emphasis on the role
of the magistrate in the situation confronting them in the Leon case. In
warrantless searches and seizures, we must do what we can to maximize
the chances that the police will know and follow the law so that
violations of the Fourth Amendment will be reduced. As has been noted,
the Court has recognized the role of the Exclusionary Rule in promoting
police training and removing the rewards of a violation. The Court
should not abandon the critical limitation in the Leon holding, nor
should it abandon the long held acceptance of the proposition that
excluding evidence will advance the values of the Fourth Amendment.
The third point is that applying the good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures will significantly reduce the effectiveness of
the Exclusionary.Rule and will be very difficult to administer. Consider
the example of a warrantless arrest. A police officer has observed facts
A, B, and C, which lead him to believe a suspect is carrying illegal
drugs. The officer, believing he has probable cause to arrest, goes ahead
and arrests the suspect. Suppose no drugs are, found, but that the
search incident to arrest reveals an illegal weapon. The suspect, now
facing a weapons charge, challenges the arrest as not being supported
by probable cause. At the suppression hearing, the officer testifies to
how facts A, B, and C lead him to make the arrest. However, the judge
concludes that facts A, B, and C do not establish probable cause that a
drug offense was being committed. If the good faith exception applies,
the judge must now ask, "Was this mistake of law a mistake that a
reasonably well trained officer could make?" Just last term, the
Supreme Court reiterated the difficulty of precisely defining probable
cause and its side-kick, reasonable suspicion:
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause"
mean is not possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions
that deal with "'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life

91. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948))).
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on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act... 7
[T]hese two legal principles are not "finely-tuned standards," comparable to the standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. They are instead fluid concepts that
take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which
the standards are being assessed.9
Given the fluid nature of the definition of probable cause, it will be
easy for the judge to conclude that the officer made a reasonable error.
Indeed, the judge may be reluctant to conclude that the mistake was so
bad that the officer should be branded as incompetent. And that is
exactly how a suppression order will translate: "Officer, I find that no
reasonably well trained officer could have made this mistake."
Furthermore, the decisions facing courts applying the good faith
exception to warrantless searches and seizures often will require an
involved, time-consuming inquiry. Determining good faith in cases not
involving a warrant will be much more involved than cases in which
there is a warrant, like Leon. And more often than not, the inquiry will
result in admission of the challenged evidence.
The extention of the good faith exception to warrantless searches and
seizures may well alter "the behavior of courts, police, prosecutors, and
defense lawyers in undesirable ways. The courts may well streamline
proceedings by addressing the issue of good faith first, and thereby,
avoid a clear ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue. The courts may
reason that if the case is a close call, that the officer's mistake fits the
good faith exception and that a definitive resolution of the Fourth
Amendment issue is unnecessary and a waste of time. In Leon, the
Supreme Court discouraged that style of adjudication, 3 but it is
difficult to believe that courts would not be tempted to resolve cases in
the most expeditious manner. If the courts took this approach, the
development of Fourth Amendment law would be retarded. Instead of

92. Ornelas v. United States, 1661 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996) (citations omitted). In
Ornelas the Court held that federal appellate courts must review appeals from denials of
suppression motions de novo in cases involving warrantless searches and seizures. The
Court maintained the clear error standard for cases involving warrants. Id. at 1659.
What, if anything, does the Ornelas decision portend for expansion of the good faith
exception to warrantless searches and seizures? On the one hand, the heightened scrutiny
on appeals involving warrantless searches and seizures suggests heightened concern about
warrantless cases; indeed, the Court in Ornelas stated that it believed the heightened

scrutiny in warrantless cases creates an incentive for officers to obtain warrants. Id. at
1663. On the other hand, heightened appellate scrutiny in warrantless cases might be an

extra safeguard to reassure those concerned about extention of the good faith exception to
warrantless cases.
93. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924-25.
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caselaw with case-by-case guidance as to what is a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, we would have caselaw that identified close
questions justifying a finding of an objectively reasonable mistake of law.
The conduct of the police will also be affected. When courts issue
opinions finding a violation of the Fourth Amendment, that ruling will
often be accompanied by a finding that the violation was objectively
reasonable. It will be tempting for the law enforcement establishment
to train officers not only that a given arrest was found not to be
supported by probable cause, but also that the evidence from that arrest
was not suppressed because the violation was a good faith error. The
cases thus become a guide to commiting objectively reasonable violations
of the Fourth Amendment. Police will be trained not only about the line
between the legal and the illegal, but also about the line between the
reasonably illegal and the unreasonably illegal. The police, engaged as
they are in the fight against crime, may be expected to conduct
themselves according to what will result in suppression rather than
what is held to violate the Fourth Amendment. And, given the fluid
nature of probable cause and the need for case-by-case determinations,
it would be difficult to conclude that the issuance of a decision finding
a Fourth Amendment violation would put officers on notice so that they
could not claim good faith error in similar circumstances.
The behavior of prosecutors will also be changed. In the absence of a
good faith exception in cases of warrantless searches and seizures,
prosecutors are motivated to play a significant screening role. Where
the prosecutor finds that probable cause is absent, a decision is often
made to decline to seek to use the fruits of the illegal search or seizure.
Many Fourth Amendment violations are never considered by a court, but
are filtered out of the system by the prosecutor. Under the regime of the
good faith exception, the prosecutor's motivation is changed: Even when
the prosecutor believes probable cause is absent, the fruits of the search
or seizure may be used if the court can be convinced that the error was
made in good faith. Prosecutors would join the courts and the police in
focusing not on the fact of the Fourth Amendment violation, but on
characterizing the conduct of the police as a good faith error. Indeed,
prosecutors might find themselves under considerable pressure from
police to push for good faith findings, not only because the evidence
could be used, but because of the implications of a good faith finding in
the event a civil suit is brought against the officer."
Is it possible that defense lawyers might behave differently under a
good faith exception? It has been argued that the good faith exception
would distort the development of Fourth Amendment law by making

94.

See the discussion of qualified immunity, supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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suppression motions nearly futile and allowing courts to avoid declarations of illegal conduct by finding that any error was reasonable.95 It
is doubtful that defense lawyers would not pursue possibly valid claims,
particularly when litigating the issue would involve a hearing and a
chance to see and test part of the government's case. But it is possible
that a flood of good faith findings would discourage defense lawyers in
some cases. It is also possible that in deciding the threshold issue of
whether to grant the defendant a hearing on a motion to suppress that
the court might find that the defense made a sufficient showing of a
violation, but an inadequate showing that the violation was not a good
faith error.
The minimal nature of the test for probable cause means that many,
if not most, police errors on probable cause are close cases or near
misses. When speaking of probable cause determinations with or
without a warrant, at least it is plausible to speak of a category of
judgments by the police that are objectively reasonable but not based on
probable cause. But there is a further conceptual problem when
considering good faith errors under the standard of reasonable suspicion.
The reasonable suspicion standard, of course, is a test of reasonability.
Where a judge finds a lack of reasonable suspicion, the application of the
good faith exception would have the judge ask: Is this mistake one that
a reasonably well trained officer could make? That requires application
of another test of reasonability. Finding that the good faith exception
applies requires finding that the stop was "reasonably unreasonable."'
In the context of fluid reasonable suspicion determinations, this test
seems unworkable. In effect, such a test would recognize a category of
cases involving unreasonable searches and seizures that a reasonably
well trained officer could have conducted.9 7 Interpreting the Fourth
Amendment to contain such a standard would not be a proud moment
in the history of the Bill of Rights.

95. Proposed Changes to the Exclusionary Rule, 50 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION

YoRK 385 (1995).
96. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643. It is interesting to note that in Anderson, the Court did
not discriminate between reasonable police errors in probable cause determinations and
police errors in reasonable suspicion cases. The Court rejected the argument that adoption
of a reasonable error standard in a probable cause determination was to create a category
of "reasonably unreasonable" searches. Id. at 643-44.
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it without a detailed discussion. Id. There was a vigorous and persuasive dissent in the
only federal appeals court decision applying the good faith exception to investigatory stops
based on reasonable suspicion. See United States v. DeLeon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 402-09
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CONCLUSION

The good faith exception should not be extended to cases involving
warrantless searches and seizures. The Exclusionary Rule, the only
effective way to enforce the Fourth Amendment, should remain in full
force in such cases. The price of police error in such cases should be
exclusion. That will promote police training and remove any reward for
a violation. This is especially critical in warrantless searches and
seizures, where the training of the police is the only way to prevent
violations. Adopting the good faith exception in such cases will
dramatically reduce the beneficial effects of the the Exclusionary Rule
and will prove difficult to administer. As Professor Greenhalgh has
stated,
The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment was not written on flash
paper; its words are indelibly inscribed with the sanctity of constitu-

tional impregnability. Extending the good faith warrant sanctuary
exception to warrantless searches would be an unwarranted expansion
of this narrow exception ....

[Olught the Court not needlessly cast

adrift one last exclusionary safeguard by this inexorable process of
devitalization. The rule is hardly a derelict on the sea of the law, as
it protects us all."
Amen. Limiting the good faith exception to cases involving warrants (or
reliance on a statute) will strike a proper balance between the values of
the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model. We should chart
a glide path that protects the integrity of the Fourth Amendment and
ensures that the process of devitalizing the Exclusionary Rule will not
undermine the integrity of the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments as well.

98. William W. Greenhalgh, The Warrantless Good Faith Exception-Unprecedented,
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